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INCOME TAXATION AND DAMAGES
FOR PERSONAL INJURIES
The Internal Revenue Code1 excludes from gross income the
amount of any damages received by agreement or by suit on account
of personal injuries. The problem arises as to the relevance of this
provision to the assessment of damages based on the claimant's loss
of earning potential.2 Two questions are presented: (1) Should the
jury be given an instruction that any damages awarded are not sub-
ject to income tax? (2) Should the damages for impairment to earn-
ing potential be diminished because if the injury had not occurred
the claimant would have had to pay income tax on such earnings?
The majority of American jurisdictions in which the issue has
arisen have answered both questions in the negative.3 The increase in
the amounts of damage verdicts in personal injury cases and the high
level of income taxes make the questions immediate.
Every personal injury award is the summation of several compen-
sable elements. While jurisdictions differ on these elements, the basic
items for which compensation is sought are past and future medical
expenses, past and future pain and suffering, loss of earnings prior to
the trial and impairment of future earning potential. The problem of
IInt. Rev. Code of 1954, §104(a)(2).
2 See, 44 Ky. L.J. 384 (1956).
3 E.g., Affirming Instruction: Poirier v. Shireman, 129 So.2d 439 (Fla.
1961); Dempsey v. Thompson, 251 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. 1952). Refusing Instruc-
tion: Combs v. Chicago, St. P., Mpls. & 0. fly., 135 F. Supp. 750 (N.D. Iowa,
1955); Wagner v. Illinois Cent. fy., 7 IUI. App.2d 445, 129 N.E.2d 771 (1955);
Hall v. Chicago G. W. fy., 5 111.2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77 (1955); Spencer v.
Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 186 Kan. 345, 350 P.2d 18 (1960); Louisville &
N. R. R. v. Mattingly, 318 S.W.2d 844 (Ky. 1958); Briggs v. Chicago G. W. Ry.,
248 Minn. 418, 80 N.W.2d 625 (1957); Bracy v. Great No. fy., 343 P.2d 848
(Mont. 1959); Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Harry Crow & Son, Inc., 6 Wis.2d
396, 94 N.W.2d 577 (1959). Allowing Instruction: McWeeney v. New York
N. H. & H. R. R., 282 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1960) (dictum); Anderson v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 97 (S.D. Cal. 1960) (The court held that the
giving of the cautionary instruction is discretionary); Atherley v. MacDonald,
Young & Nelson, Inc., 142 Cal. App.2d 575, 298 P.2d 700 (1956) (dictum);
Maus v. New York. Chi. & St. L. R.B., 135 N.E.2d 253 (Ohio 1956) (dictum
in concurring opinion); Texas & N. 0. By. v. Pool, 263 S.W.2d 582 (Texas Civ.
App. 1953) (dictum); Behringer v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 6 Wis.2d 595,
95 N.W.2d 249 (1959) (dictum). Refusing Admission of Plaintiff's Tax Liability:
Chicago N.W. R.f. v. Curl., 178 F.2d 497 (8th Cir. 1949); Stokes v. United
States, 144 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1944); Runnels v. City of Douglas, 124 F. Supp.
657 (D.C. Alaska 1954); O'Donnell v. Great No. fy., 109 F. Sup . 590 (N.D.
Cal. 1951); Hall v. Chicago & N.W. R.f., 5 Ill.2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77 (1955);
Hoge v. Anderson, 200 Va. 364, 106 S.E.2d 121 (1958); Texas & N.O. By. v.
Pool, 263 S.W.2d 582 (Texas Civ. App. 1953). Admitting Evidence of Plaintiff's
Tax Liability: O'Conner v. United States. 269 F.2d 578 (2d Cir. 1959) (death);
Southern Pac. Co. v. Guthrie, 186 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1951) (dictum); Meehan
v. Central B.R., 181 F. Supp. 594 (S.D. N.Y. 1960) (death); De Vito v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 88 (E.D. N.Y. 1951) (dictum); Armentrout v.
Virginian fy., 72. F. Supp. 997 (S.D. W.Va. 1947) (dictum); Floyd v. Fruit
Indus., Inc., 144 Conn. 659, 136 A.2d 918 (1957) (death).
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taxation relates to the assessment of a sum to compensate fairly the
claimant for this last element, i.e., impairment of future earning
potential.
The basic principle the jury must follow is one of restitution:
to accurately compensate the plaintiff for his loss-to make the plain-
tiff "whole." A determination of the present cash value of a loss of
future earning potential involves many considerations. A figure ap-
proximating the sum the plaintiff would have earned, but for the
injury, is determined by the use of actuarial tables and a considera-
tion of the plaintiffs health, the nature of his occupation, the possi-
bility of promotion and an increase in earnings. Throughout the
presentation of the evidence, the final arguments and the charge,
much time is spent in aiding the jury in its task of determining an
accurate amount to which the claimant is entitled. The jury is
cautioned not to use emotion or sympathy, is permitted to view
mathematical calculations on a blackboard, and is allowed to consider
interest rates in reducing the award to present worth,4 per diem
evaluations of pain and suffering,5 annuity and life expectancy tables,6
the purchasing power of the dollar7 and the increased cost of living."
Why then is the subject of income tax withheld from the jury's knowl-
edge and consideration? Does not an injured party receive inflated
compensation for impairment to future earning capacity when such
a figure includes an amount mistakenly intended to cover the plain-
tiffs imaginary tax liability on the award or is based on an amount
which he would never have received, i.e., gross earnings? One view
was expressed in an opinion for the English House of Lords:
To ignore the tax element at the present day would be to act in a
manner which is out of touch with reality. Nor can I regard the tax
element as so remote that it should be disregarded in assessing dam-
ages. The obligation to pay tax-save for those in possession of
exiguous incomes-is almost universal in its application. That obli-
gation is ever present in the minds of those who are called on to pay
taxes, and no sensible person any longer regards the net earnings
from his trade or profession as the equivalent of his available in-
come. Indeed, save for the fact that in many cases-though by no
means in all cases-the tax only becomes payable after the money
has been received, there is, I think, no element of remoteness or
uncertainty about its incidence. 9
Yet the American courts, in general, refuse to follow the logic of
4 See Annot., 77 A.L.R. 1439 (1932).
5 Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mattingly, 839 S.W.2d 155 (Ky. 1960); 49 Ky. L.J.
592 (1960).6 See, Ky. Rev. Stats.. Tables, Vol. III, Life Expectancy and Annuity Table.
7 See Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 611 (1950).
8 Ibid.9 British Transp. Comm'n v. Gourley, [1955] 3 All E.R. 796, 802.
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this reasoning by denying an instruction to the effect that plaintiff's
recovery is not subject to income tax' ° and by excluding evidence of
plaintiff's income tax liability as a ground for diminishing the award.
The propriety of the cautionary instruction and the admissibility
of evidence concerning income tax liability are separate problems and
will be examined as such.
The Cautionary Instruction
Can there be any sound reason for not so instructing the jury?
We can think of none. Surely, the plaintiff has no right to receive
an enhanced award due to a possible and, we think, probable mis-
conception on the part of a jury that the amount allowed by it will
be reduced by income taxes. Such an instruction would at once
and for all purposes take the subject of income taxes out of the case.11
This quotation was taken from the leading American decision up-
holding the minority view permitting such an instruction. The
Missouri court reasoned that present economic conditions made citi-
zens acutely sensitive to the impact of income taxes. According to
the court:
It is reasonable to assume the average juror would believe the award
. . . to be subject to such taxes. It seems clear, therefore, that in
order to avoid any harm such a misconception could bring about,
it would be competent and desirable to instruct the jury that an
award of damages for personal injuries is not subject to Federal or
State income taxes.12
The instruction involved in the case merely informed the jury of the
non-taxable nature of the award. The court suggested a broader
instruction:
'You are instructed that any award made to plaintiff as damages in
this case, if any award is made, is not subject to Federal or State
income taxes, and you should not consider such taxes in fixing the
amount of any award made plaintiff, if any you make.'13
In the leading case holding such an instruction improper, the Illinois
court stated that such an instruction introduced an extraneous subject,
giving rise to conjecture and speculation.14
These two cases are representative of the lines of American
IOIRC §104(a)(2).
11 Dempsey v. Thompson, 251 S.W.2d 42, 45 (Mo. 1952).
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 Ill.2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77 (1955). The
information actually was presented to the jury by counsel, but the principle is
the same. A suggestion was made in Shipman Income Tax Aspects of Personal
Injury Litigation, 37 Texas L. Rev. 77 (19593, to the effect that argument by
both sides would better impress the jury with what it can and cannot do than
would an instruction. The defendant's counsel would urge not to add any sum for
tax purposes; plaintiff's counsel would urge the use of gross earnings instead of
net earnings as a basis for assessing damages. In this way many of the objec-
tions to the instruction would be avoided.
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authority on the issue of the propriety of such an instruction. The
basic arguments against the propriety of such an instruction are:
(1) it interjects a new element into the case giving rise to specula-
tion and conjecture; 15 (2) it assumes that the jurors will not adhere
to the limitations given in the other instructions on the measure of
damages; 16 (3) it would require a charge that the plaintiff's recovery
will be diminished by counsel fees, witness expenses and other costs;
1 7
(4) it is "cautionary" in nature; 18 (5) it would be contrary to strong
precedent in the majority of jurisdictions in which the issue has been
considered.' 9
However, it is submitted that the arguments in favor of such an
instruction not only refute those supporting its impropriety but
outweigh them. (1) A cautionary instruction similar to the one sug-
gested by the Missouri court 2° does not introduce a new element,
but eliminates one. Because of the wide-spread tax influence on al-
most every dollar obtained today, certainly many jurors consider the
"tax angle." Rules of evidence permit the jury to draw upon com-
mon knowledge;21 in several cases jurors have actually asked the
specific question whether the award was free from income tax-
ation.22 Neither would such an instruction give rise to speculation
and conjecture. Many who advance this argument fail to distinguish
between the two separate problems, 23 i.e., the cautionary instruction
and admission of evidence of plaintiff's tax liability. To indulge in
the former would not involve a prediction of future tax rates, the
plaintiff's status nor the use of tax experts, the elements which usually
form the basis of argument against any evidence of tax liability.
The instruction merely cautions the jury not to consider the tax aspect.
Thus, the tax question is taken from the jury, thereby eliminating
the danger of inflated awards due to an erroneous belief on the part
of the jury. (2) The instruction is not based on an assumption that
15 Combs v. Chicago, St. P., Mpls. & 0. By., 135 F. Supp. 750 (N.D. Iowa
1955); Hall v. Chicago & N.W. By., 5 IUl.2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77, 86 (1955).
16 Mitchell v. Emblade, 80 Ariz. 898, 298 P.2d 1034 (1956); Hall v. Chicago
& N.W. By., 5 Ill.2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77 (1955).
17 3 Belli, Modem Trials §897(7) (1954).
38 Combs v. Chicago, St. P., Mpls. & 0. By., 135 F. Supp. 750 (N.D. Iowa
1955)
19 Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mattingly, 318 S.W.2d 844 (Ky. 1958); Briggs v.
Chicago G.W. Ry., 248 Minn. 418, 80 N.W.2d 625 (1957).
20 Dempsey v. Thompson, 251 S.W.2d 42, 45 (Mo. 1952).
21 9 Wigmore, Evidence §2570 (3rd ed. 1940).22 Knachel, Jury Instructions on Tax Exemption in Personal Injury Cases,
6 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 71, 74 (1957). Also see, Spencer v. Eby Constr. Co., 186
Kan. 345, 350 P.2d 18, 21 (1960), wherein such a question was asked.2 3 Briggs v. Chicago G.W. By., 248 Minn. 418, 80 N.W.2d 625, 635
(1957); Maus v. New York, Chi, & St. L. Rd., 165 Ohio St. 281, 135 N.E.2d
253 (1956).
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the jury would exceed the limits of the other instructions; it would
supplement them by giving additional information.24 Enlightenment
of the jury has always been necessary in any trial, especially one in
which so many elements of damage are involved.25 (3) An instruc-
tion on tax liability is much more relevant than one concerning the
plaintiff's expenses, since the latter is dependent solely upon the
claimant's arrangements. (4) The fact that an instruction is "caution-
ary" does not condemn it per se. Many cautionary instructions are
given and they have an important role in our jurisprudence.26 Without
them juries would be deprived of much necessary information and
guidance. (5) To refute the argument of precedent it is only neces-
sary to state that our system of jurisprudence has had much of its
success in the courts' ability to overturn lines of decision based on
incorrect or inaccurate policy.
27
For these reasons it is difficult to understand how such an instruc-
tion could be prejudicial to the claimant. The realistic approach of
the Missouri court 28 clears the issue of confusion. The instruction
correctly states an important item of substantive law and diminishes,
rather than adds to the number of subjects which the jury is to con-
sider.
There is much dicta29 supporting such an instruction, but no court
has, as yet, reversed for a refusal by the trial court to give the in-
struction. Several instructions have been rejected due to defective
drafting. The purpose of proper drafting is to convince the appellate
court that no harm resulted to the claimant by a reduction of the
verdict to which he otherwise would be entitled.30 A properly drafted
instruction should emphasize that the jury is not to add anything to
the compensatory sum for taxes.31
A recent approach to this problem is found in a 1960 case32 in-
24 Roettger, The Cautionary Instruction on Income Taxes in Negligence
Actions, 18 W.&L.L. Rev. 1 (1961).25 Morris, Should Juries in Personal Injury Cases Be Instructed That Its Re-
coveries Are Not Income Within the Meaning of Federal Tax Law?, 3 Def.
L.J. 3 (1958).26 Morris & Nordstrom, Personal Injury Recoveries and the Federal Income
Tax Law, 46 A.B.A.J. 274, 275 (1960).27 See, Stewart v. United States 267 F.2d 378, 381 (10th Cir. 1959); Hanks
v. McDanell, 307 Ky. 243, 249-50, 210 S.W.2d 784, 787-88 (1948).
28Dempsey v. Thompson, 251 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. 1952).
29MeWeeney v. New York, N.H.&H. Ry., 282 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1960),
wherein the court approved of an instruction not to add anything for taxes, but
would not reverse for a refusal to give the instruction. See the two dissenting
opinions seeking reversal for the trial court's refusal to give the instruction. See
Note 3 supra.3 0 Morris & Nordstrom, supra note 26 at 276.3l Behringer v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 6 Wis.2d 595, 95 N.W.2d
249 (1959) (dictum).
3
2 Anderson v. United Air Lines, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 97 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
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volving a wrongful death action. The district court held that the
matter of giving such an instruction was within its discretion. This
opinion also mentioned that the majority of reported cases on this
issue arose as a result of the refusal in the lower court to give such
an instruction.3 Perhaps in time an appellate court will consider a
refusal to give the instruction as reversible error and any verdict
awarded without such to be excessive.
In 1958 the Court of Appeals of Kentucky labelled the request
for such an instruction "a novel assertion."3 4 While reversing a judg-
ment for the plaintiff on other grounds, the court disapproved of such
an instruction: "We are of the opinion Kentucky should follow the
majority rule which brands such an instruction as misleading in its
effect on the minds of the jury."35 The court concluded "it will serve
no good purpose to write at length on this issue . . ."36 It is hoped
that the Court of Appeals will regard the instruction as proper the
next time the issue arises and thereby aid in the accurate determin-
ation of personal injury awards.
Evidence of Tax Liability
As was stated above, the principle of damages is compensation-
to restore to the plaintiff that which he lost. Damages should retain
the same net value of the assets they replace.37 The award should
neither be inadequate nor excessive. The problem arises when the
plaintiff includes as items of damages loss of wages and impairment
of future earning potential. When the jury bases its assessment of a
compensatory sum for these losses on plaintiff's gross earnings rather
than net earnings, the plaintiff is recovering more than he lost. There-
fore, the court should admit evidence of the plaintiff's income tax
liability. As one writer states, a defendant takes his victim as he
finds him, with "thick or thin skull, whether with a large income or
small, whether lightly or heavily taxed."38 Unfortunately most Ameri-
can jurisdictions refuse to recognize the relevance of taxation, how-
ever, the English courts have recognized its applicability.39 In over-
ruling a line of decisions refusing to recognize the incident of taxation
as a pertinent element, the House of Lords held that the damages to
which the claimant was entitled were such as would compensate him
33 Id. at 98.
3 4 Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mattingly, 318 S.W.2d 844, 848 (Ky. 1958), 48
Ky. L.J. 326 (1960).
35 318 S.W.2d, ibid.
36 Ibid.
3 7 Jolowicz Damages and Income Tax, 1959 Camb. L.J. 86 (1959).38 The Relevance of Tax Liability in Assessing Damages, 1959 Scots L.T.
133, 134 (1959).39 British Transp. Comn'n v. Gourley, [1955] 3 All E.R. 796, 802.
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for the loss of taxed earnings, which were the measure of his real loss.
I cannot think that the risk of confusion arising if the tax position
be taken into consideration should make us hesitate to apply the rule
of law if we can ascertain what that rule is. Nor should we be de-
terred from applying that rule by the consistent or inveterate prac-
tice of the courts in not taking the tax position into consideration
in those cases in which the courts were never invited to do So.
40
The basic reasons given by American courts for refusing to admit
evidence of the claimanfs tax liability are: (1) The amount of tax
liability to reduce is too conjectural and speculative,41 since tax rates,
the plaintiff's status, allowable deductions and exemptions are likely
to change; (2) in order to determine a claimant's tax liability, tech-
nical testimony by a parade of tax experts would be necessary;42 (3)
income tax is a matter strictly between the claimant and the taxing
authority;43 (4) to allow a reduction for tax liability frustrates con-
gressional intent4 4 to benefit claimants in personal injury cases; 45 (5)
to allow such a reduction would be contrary to the weight of au-
thority.4
6
The evidence of the claimant's tax liability could be presented to
the jury in several ways, the most obvious being cross-examination
of the plaintiff, introduction of his income tax returns for prior years,
and examination of the actuary who testified on the question of
present worth.47 Several cases have indicated by way of dictum some
approval of the jury's use of net instead of gross earnings48 and two
cases involving death actions allowed such a reduction.49 Perhaps
courts hearing personal injury cases will also allow a reduction by
the amount of tax liability when the above arguments are refuted
satisfactorily. (1) The argument of conjecture and speculation as re-
gards loss of wages prior to the trial is weak. The tax rates, the number
of the claimant's exemptions and his deductions can be determined
with relative ease. Admittedly there is some conjecture and specu-
lation in determining impairment of future earning potential, but not
enough to justify a refusal to admit evidence of income taxes. Un-
40 Ibid.
41 Stokes v. United States, 144 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1944).4 2 Highshew v. Kushto, 285 Ind. 505, 134 N.E.2d 555 (1956), involved a
requested instruction but the language used is representative of this argument.43 Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 Ill.2d 185, 125 N.E.2d 77 (1955).
4 4 IRC §104(a) (2).45 Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 Ill.2d 185, 125 N.E.2d 77 (1955).
46 Nordstrom, Income Taxes and Personal Injury Awards, 19 Ohio St. L.J.
212 (1958).
47 Ibid.4 8 See, note 3 supra.
49 Floyd v. Fruit Indus., Inc., 144 Conn. 659, 186 A.2d 918 (1957). O'Con-
nor v. United States, 269 F.2d 578 (2d Cir. 1959) (no jury, tried under
F.T.C.A.).
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certainty is bound to be present in every lump sum award 50 The
continuance of the plaintiff's salary is conjectural, yet evidence con-
cerning it is admitted.5 1 Some courts even allow the plaintiff to spec-
late as to increased income.52 The continuance of plaintiff's health
and ambition to work are other speculations indulged in by the trier-
of-fact. (2) The use of experts to testify as to plaintiff's future pain
and suffering is generally accepted. Why not as to plaintiffs tax
liability?53 (3) Stating that the tax aspect is a matter between the
plaintiff and the taxing authority only avoids the real question of
how to measure the award accurately. Any other relation between
the plaintiff and a third person is considered if it aids in measuring
the loss. In determining loss of future earning potential the courts
can deduct expenses, salaries, office rent and other charges upon the
plaintiff.54 A related argument sometimes given is that the court will
not concern itself with what the plaintiff does with his money. This
is true, but the statement assumes that the award is commensurate
with the plaintiff's loss; until the award is accurately measured, the
court has a duty to be concerned.55 (4) This argument centered
around the idea that a "collateral source" benefit had been extended
to the plaintiff, and that the defendant could not profit by having
his liability diminished accordingly. However, Congress did not in-
tend that I.R.C. Section 104 be read as a benefit to injured claimants;
rather Congress doubted that an award would qualify as income under
the 16th amendment. Even if the provision could be constructed as
bestowing a benefit, the statute exempts the award from taxation,
not the elements considered in determining it. Furthermore, the
statute deals with the award after it has been properly measured and
determined. 57 (5) Concerning the argument of established precedent
one need only view the English decision5" which overturned the estab-
lished rule. There is already some dicta in favor of such a reduc-
tion in personal injury59 cases and some actual decisions dealing with
death actions.
60
Writers on the subject have pointed out the possibility that if no
changes are made in the negligence field, automobile cases will be
502 Harper & James, The Law of Torts §25.12 (1956).51 Nordstrom, supra note 46 at 227.
52 Turrietta v. Wyche, 54 N.M. 5, 212 P.2d 1041 (1949).
53 Morris & Nordstrom, supra note 26.
54 Shipman, supra note 14.55 Morris & Nordstrom, supra note 26.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 British Transp. Comm'n v. Gourley, [1955] 3 All E.R. 796.
59 See, note 3 supra.6 0 See, note 49 supra.
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treated like industrial injuries, in that legislatures will establish ad-
ministrative agencies to handle problems too complex for the law
courts,0 ' or will be treated under a plan of compulsory motor vehicle
comprehensive loss insurance.
62
In the near future it is likely that the courts will permit instruc-
tions for the purpose of preventing the jury from increasing an award
because of an erroneous belief. Perhaps the courts will also recognize
the need for admitting evidence which attempts to reduce an award
to an amount commensurate with the actual loss sustained. "Courts
are avoiding their responsibilities when they decline to make the best
guess they can, once all the reasonably available evidence has been
brought before them."6 3
Marshall P. Eldred, Jr.
o Nordstrom, supra note 46.
6 2 Green, Traffic Victims: Tort Law and Insurance (1958).
6 3 Harper & James, op. cit. supra note 50.
